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The change detection task has become a standard method for estimating the storage
capacity of visual working memory. Most researchers assume that this task isolates the
properties of an active short-term storage system that can be dissociated from long-term
memory systems. However, long-term memory storage may inﬂuence performance on
this task. In particular, memory traces from previous trials may create proactive interfer-
ence that sometimes leads to errors, thereby reducing estimated capacity. Consequently,
the capacity of visual working memory may be higher than is usually thought, and correla-
tions between capacity and other measures of cognition may reﬂect individual differences
in proactive interference rather than individual differences in the capacity of the short-term
storage system. Indeed, previous research has shown that change detection performance
can be inﬂuenced by proactive interference under some conditions. The purpose of the
present study was to determine whether the canonical version of the change detection
task – in which the to-be-remembered information consists of simple, brieﬂy presented
features – is inﬂuenced by proactive interference.Two experiments were conducted using
methods that ordinarily produce substantial evidence of proactive interference, but no
proactive interference was observed. Thus, the canonical version of the change detection
task can be used to assess visual working memory capacity with no meaningful inﬂuence
of proactive interference.
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INTRODUCTION
Visual workingmemory capacity has been studied extensively with
variants of the change detection paradigm (Phillips, 1974; Luck
and Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001; Woodman et al., 2001; Alvarez
and Cavanagh, 2004; Olson and Jiang, 2004; Xu and Chun, 2006;
Awh et al., 2007; Rouder et al., 2008). In this paradigm, a sample
array containing several objects is presented brieﬂy (e.g., 100ms),
followed by a short retention interval (e.g., 900ms) and then a
test array (see Figure 1). Observers report whether the test array
is identical to the sample array or whether one item has changed.
This task can readily be used to estimate an individual’s working
memory storage capacity. Speciﬁcally, if the number of items in
the sample array (the set size, denoted N ) exceeds the number of
items that can be held in memory (the storage capacity, denoted
K ), then only a subset of the items in the sample array will be
stored in memory (i.e., K÷N of the items). By measuring the
actual probability that given observer is able to detect the changes,
along with the probability of false alarms on no-change trials, it is
possible to provide a mathematically principled estimate of K for
that observer (reviewed by Rouder et al., 2011). Strikingly, individ-
ual differences in K measured from change detection and related
tasks with very simple stimuli (e.g., colored squares) are strongly
correlated with measures of complex cognitive abilities and global
ﬂuid intelligence (Fukuda et al., 2010; Gold et al., 2010).
Most research using this class of tasks has assumed, whether
implicitly or explicitly, that performance reﬂects the active main-
tenance of information in a short-term memory system that can
be distinguished from long-term memory systems (see review
by Luck, 2008). Indeed, event-related potential (ERP) and func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown
that neural activity increases temporarily during the retention
interval in these tasks in a manner that is closely tied to individ-
ual differences in storage capacity (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004;
Todd andMarois, 2005; Xu and Chun, 2006). However, the history
of memory research is ﬁlled with examples of results that were
initially attributed to a separate short-term memory system but
were later explained by the samememorymechanisms that under-
lie long-term memory (see reviews by Crowder, 1982; Baddeley,
1986; Suprenant and Neath, 2009). In particular, limits in mem-
ory performance that were initially attributed to limits in storage
capacity were later found to be explainable by the same interfer-
ence mechanisms that explain failures of retrieval in long-term
memory.
Two main types of interference might explain the apparent
limits on visual working memory capacity in change detection
paradigms. First, items that are similar to each other might be
confused (see, e.g., the classic study of Conrad, 1964). In the case
of long-term memory, for example, someone who is trying to
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FIGURE 1 | Stimuli and design used in Experiment 1. (A) Shape,
color, and orientation stimulus sets. (B) Sequence of events in a set of
three blocks of trials. A set of three digits was presented at the
beginning of each set of three blocks, and participants continuously
repeated these digits aloud for the entire set of three blocks. Each
block began with a cue indicating which feature set would be used for
that block. This was followed with 10 change detection trials with the
cued feature set.
remember the name of a chemical that is highly similar to the
names of other chemicals that were encoded at the same time
might simply report the wrong chemical name at the time of test.
Similarly, an individual who is trying to remember several similar
colors in a change detection taskmightmix up the colors when the
test array is presented. However, recent evidence suggests that this
kind of interference plays little or no role in limiting performance
in typical change detection tasks. First, Awh et al. (2007) found
that change detection performance for Chinese characters was no
worse for arrays containing four Chinese characters that it was for
arrays containing two Chinese characters and two shaded cubes,
despite the greater degree of interitem similarity when all four
items were Chinese characters. (They did ﬁnd that performance
was worse when the similarity between sample and test stimuli was
increased, but this is an inevitable consequence of decreased dis-
criminability; that is, a small enough changewill always be difﬁcult
to detect.) Second, Lin and Luck (2008) found that color change
detection performance was no worse for arrays containing three
highly similar colors than it was for arrays containing three very
different colors. Thus, there is no evidence that interitem similarity
has a signiﬁcant impact on change detection performance, which
contrasts with the substantial effects of interitem similarity that
have been well-documented in the long-term memory literature
(Tulving and Psotka, 1971; Runquist, 1975; Anderson and Neely,
1996).
A second type of interferencemight limit performance in visual
change detection tasks, namely proactive interference from items
presented on previous trials. Proactive interference usually arises
when participants are confused about whether an item was pre-
sented on the current trial or on a previous trial. For example,
in the classic study of Peterson and Peterson (1959), participants
received a list of three letters, which they were then required to
recall after a ﬁlled delay period. Recall performance became grad-
ually less accurate as the delay period increased, nearing ﬂoor by a
delay of 18 s, and this was originally attributed to a gradual fading
of a short-term memory representation. However, it could also be
explained by a confusion between the letters that had been pre-
sented at the beginning of the current trial and the letters that had
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been presented on previous trials. For example,Keppel andUnder-
wood (1962) showed that recall was very good at long delays on
the ﬁrst trial (presumably because there was no interference from
previous trials). Similarly, Wickens et al. (1963) presented par-
ticipants with several trials with one class of memory materials
and then switched to another class, and they found no evidence
of decay for the ﬁrst trial with a new type of memory mater-
ial (presumably because the different type of material from the
previous trials did not cause interference with the current trial).
Similar effects have been observed in complex working memory
span tasks (Bunting, 2006). This recovery of performance for the
ﬁrst trial of a new type of material is called release from proactive
interference.
This same type of interference could, in principle, arise in
change detection tasks. For example, if an item was blue in the
sample array and changed to red in the test array, the presence of
red on a previous trial might lead to a feeling of familiarity for
the red item in the current trial, and the observer might there-
fore not report that the red color is new (for the current trial).
Indeed, proactive interference has been shown to have a signiﬁ-
cant impact on estimates of working memory capacity in complex
span tasks (May et al., 1999), and individual differences in the
ability to overcome proactive interference may explain some of
the correlations between complex span performance and mea-
sures of cognitive ability (Lustig et al., 2001; Unsworth and Engle,
2007; Blalock andMcCabe, 2011). Thus, it is critically important to
determinewhethermeasures of capacity from visual change detec-
tions tasks – which are also strongly correlated with measures of
cognitive ability – might be distorted by proactive interference.
Two studies suggest that this is a real possibility. First,Makovski
and Jiang (2008) found that observers were less likely to detect a
change if the changed color on the current trial hadbeenpresent on
the previous trial. However, this effect was present only if this color
had been at the same location on the previous trial. Although this
is theoretically interesting, such trials are relatively uncommon,
so they probably do not have much impact on working memory
capacity estimates.
Hartshorne (2008) also found evidence of proactive interfer-
ence. In one experiment, complex objects were presented in the
sample array, and the test array was a single object in the center;
participants were instructed to indicate whether this test item had
been in the sample array. They were much more likely to make a
false alarm (reporting a match when the test item had not been
in the sample array) if the test item had been present in one of
the three previous trials. In a second experiment, different stimu-
lus sets were used (e.g., sets of colored squares, sets of geometric
objects), and 10 consecutive trials were tested with a given set, fol-
lowed by 10 trials with a new set. Participants were approximately
4% more accurate on the ﬁrst trial in a set of 10 in the in the
last trial, suggesting that interference had built up over the 10 tri-
als. In a third experiment, over 3000 participants were tested in a
shape change detection task via an Internet site,making it possible
to examine performance on each of the ﬁrst 10 individual trials.
Estimated memory capacity (K ) dropped by approximately 1/4 of
an item between the ﬁrst and second trials, suggesting that per-
formance was impacted by interference after the ﬁrst trial. These
results indicated that the strict limits on visual working memory
capacity cannot be completely explained by proactive interference,
but interference can impact estimated working memory capacity
by as much as 15%.
Although these interference effects are small on average, they
may be considerably larger in some participants than in other,
so individual differences in performance might reﬂect individ-
ual differences in the ability to inhibit interference from previous
trials. Consequently, it is conceivable that correlations between
working memory capacity (as estimated from change detection
performance) and other cognitive measures could reﬂect individ-
ual differences in the inhibition of interference from long-term
memory representations. This is of great theoretical importance,
because it wouldmean that the correlations do not reﬂect individ-
ual differences in the use of an active short-term memory storage
system.
Although the results presented by Hartshorne (2008) clearly
demonstrate that some variants of the change detection task can
be impacted by proactive interference, there are reasons to believe
that the “canonical” version of this paradigm introduced by Luck
andVogel (1997)may be less prone to proactive interference. In the
Luck and Vogel (1997) version, the sample array consisted of sim-
ple features (colored squares or colored, oriented bars) that were
presented for only 100ms, followed by a 900-ms retention interval
and then a 2000-ms test display. A 2500-ms intertrial interval sep-
arated trials (for details, see Vogel et al., 2001). The brief duration
of the sample display was designed to simulate the brief period of
time that visual information is available during a typical ﬁxation
period in natural scene viewing (Henderson, 2008), and the com-
bination of the brief sample duration and brief retention interval
were designed to minimize opportunities for storing the infor-
mation in long-term memory. In contrast, most of the stimuli
used by Hartshorne (2008) were relatively complex shapes, and
the sample array duration was 1000ms. This may have provided
more opportunity for long-term memory representations to be
created. The same timing was used by Makovski and Jiang (2008),
who also found evidence of interference from the previous trial.
Consequently, it is possible that proactive interference impacted
performance more in these studies than would be found in the
Luck and Vogel (1997) version of the task. This does not imply
that the proactive interference effects in the Hartshorne (2008)
and Makovski and Jiang (2008) studies are artifactual or uninter-
esting. However, it suggests that relatively pure estimates of visual
working memory capacity can be obtained under conditions that
minimize proactive interference.
The purpose of the present study was therefore to determine
whether the canonical Luck andVogel (1997) version of the change
detection task provides a pure measure of the storage capacity of a
short-term memory system, with negligible contamination from
proactive interference. A few changes were made to the canonical
version (e.g., using articulatory suppression rather than a ver-
bal memory load to minimize contributions from verbal working
memory). However, three key elements were retained: (a) the use
of simple stimuli; (b) a very brief sample array duration; and (c)
a relatively brief retention interval. These are also the conditions
under which ERP studies have shown that an active representation
is still available at the time of the test array (Vogel andMachizawa,
2004; Vogel et al., 2005).
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EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 took the approachpioneeredbyWickens et al. (1963)
and also used by Hartshorne (2008), in which different classes of
stimuli are used and the class is changed every 10 trials. As shown
in Figure 1, the stimuli on a given trial were colored squares, ori-
ented lines, or shapes. Participants experienced short blocks of
10 trials with one of these three classes (preceded by a cue at the
beginning of each block to indicate what type of stimuli would be
presented for the next 10 trials). If proactive interference impacts
change detection performance, then performance should be best
on the ﬁrst trial of a block and then drop over the next few tri-
als. Performance should then recover on the ﬁrst trial of the next
block owing to release from proactive interference. This is the pat-
tern that was observed byWickens et al. (1963) for verbal material
and by Hartshorne (2008) in a visual change detection task. How-
ever, if proactive interference is minimized by the use of simple
stimuli, brief sample array presentations and a short retention
interval, then performance should be constant over the course of
each block.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty undergraduate students between the ages of 18 and 30
participated for course credit. They reported no history of neu-
rological problems and reported having normal color vision and
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Stimuli
Stimulus array were presented within a 4.91˚× 4.91˚ region on
a video monitor with a black background, viewed at a dis-
tance of 70 cm. Each array contained ﬁve items. Each item was
placed in one of ﬁve pre-speciﬁed locations on an imagery cir-
cle (radius= 1.95˚), and items were separated from each other
by 2.29˚ (center-to-center). A ﬁxation cross was visible through-
out each trial block. The chromaticity and luminance values for
the stimuli were measured with a Tektronix model J17 colorime-
ter using the 1976 CIE color coordinate system. Eight stimulus
colors were used: red (u′ = 0.467, v ′ = 0.520; 21.85 cd/m2), pink
(u′ = 0.301, v ′ = 0.421; 36.09 cd/m2), blue (u′ = 0.177, v ′ = 0.167;
10.76 cd/m2), green (u′ = 0.298, v ′ = 0.576; 65.71 cd/m2), yel-
low (u′ = 0.230, v ′ = 0.546; 74.62 cd/m2), violet (u′ = 0.233,
v ′ = 0.235; 18.74 cd/m2), orange (u′ = 0.356, v ′ = 0.533;
32.88 cd/m2), and teal (u′ = 0.159, v ′ = 0.315; 32.63 cd/m2).
As illustrated in Figure 1A, three sets of distinct feature dimen-
sions were used: color, shape, and orientation. On color trials,
ﬁve colored circles were presented, each subtending 1.00˚× 1.00˚
of visual angle, with a color that was randomly selected (with-
out replacement) from the set of eight colors described above. On
shape trials, ﬁve items were randomly selected (without replace-
ment) from a set of eight shapes: triangle, gateway, hourglass,
circle, cross, ﬂower, spiral, and black diamond within a white
square. Each of these shapes was 1.04˚× 1.04˚ and drawn in white
(98.24 cd/m2). On orientation trials, oriented bars (1.53˚× 0.26˚,
98.24 cd/m2) were randomly selected (without replacement) from
a set of eight orientations: 0˚, 22.5˚, 45.0˚, 67.5˚, 90.0˚, 112.5˚,
135.0˚, or 157.5˚. Note that no color, shape, or orientation
could appear more than once in an array, and when an object
changed, it changed to a value that was not present in the sample
array.
Procedure
Each trial consisted of a 100-ms sample array followed by a 900-
ms blank ﬁxation delay period and then a test array that stayed on
until the participant responded (see Figure 1B). The sample and
test arrays were identical except that one feature (e.g., color, shape,
or orientation) of one item in the test array was different from
that of the corresponding item in the sample array on 50% of the
trials. Participants responded by pressing one of two buttons on
each trial to indicate whether the sample and test arrays were the
same or different. Accuracy was stressed rather than speed, and
the responses were not timed.
Each participant was tested in a single session of 30–45min,
including rest breaks. The experiment was divided into 10 sets of
3 trial blocks, with 10 trials using a single feature type in each
block. Each set of three trial blocks included one block with each
of the three feature sets (e.g., 10 trials with shape, then 10 tri-
als with color, and then 10 trials with orientation). The order of
feature sets was constant for a given participant but counterbal-
anced across participants. The change and no-change trials were
randomly distributed across the total set of 300 trials.
Participants were informed of the feature set that would be used
in a given block by means of a cue at the beginning of the block
(see Figure 1B). The cue was visible until the participant initiated
the block by pressing a button.
To minimize contributions from verbal working memory, we
used an articulatory suppression procedure in which three ran-
domly selected white digits (2.67˚× 3.41˚) were presented side by
side at ﬁxation at the beginning of each set of three blocks (see
Figure 1B). Participantswere instructed to repeat these three digits
aloud throughout each block of trials (e.g., “nine–one–seven–
nine–one–seven. . .”). Previous research has shown that this is an
effectivemethod for discouraging verbal encoding of visual stimuli
(Besner et al., 1981; Baddeley, 1986).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this experiment, proactive interference should lead to a pro-
gressive decline in performance across trials within a block of 10
trials with the same stimulus set, and release from proactive inter-
ference should lead to a rebound in performance on the ﬁrst trial
of a block. To assess these patterns, we grouped all of the trials for
a given sequential position within a block, combining across the
30 blocks (and therefore averaging across the three feature types).
This yielded 30 trials per position for each participant.
Figure 2 shows mean change detection accuracy for each of
the 10 sequential positions. Accuracy was approximately equal
across all 10 sequential positions, with mean accuracy ranging
between 69 and 75% correct. A sharp decline in performance over
the ﬁrst few trials was not observed, nor was an improvement
observed on the ﬁrst trial of a block compared to the last several
trials. A one-way within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
indicated that there were no signiﬁcant differences among the 10
sequential positions, [F(9, 261)= 1.80, p = 0.0687]. As shown in
Figure 2, the pattern of means did not follow the typical proactive
interference pattern, in which accuracy should be high in the ﬁrst
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FIGURE 2 | Mean change detection accuracy from each of the 10 sequential positions within a block in Experiment 1 (error bars show 95%
within-subjects confidence intervals, as described by Loftus and Loftus, 1988).
sequential position and then drop to an asymptote over the next
few positions. Instead, accuracy bounced up (at positions 2, 4, and
7) and down (e.g., at positions 3, 5, and 6) in a non-systematic
manner.
To test for the speciﬁc pattern expected from proactive interfer-
ence, we conducted a follow-up t -test comparing the ﬁrst position
with the average of the last three positions. This analysis did not
approach signiﬁcance [t (58),= 0.476, p = 0.6359]. We also per-
formed anANOVAon theﬁrst three sequential positions,but again
no signiﬁcant differenceswere found,F(2,58)= 1.429,p = 0.2479.
Thus, if there were any differences among positions, they did not
follow the typical pattern of proactive interference. For example, in
an experiment that also involved a switch in stimulus class every 10
trials, Hartshorne (2008, Experiment 2) found signiﬁcantly better
performance on the ﬁrst of trial of a given stimulus class than on
the last trial, which is the expected proactive interference pattern.
In contrast, we found nearly equivalent performance between the
beginning and end of each block of 10 trials. Thus, it is likely
that the non-signiﬁcant and non-systematic differences among
sequential positions reﬂect random variation.
It is impossible to prove the null hypothesis with conventional
statistical tests. We therefore performed two additional analyses
that can indicate the likelihood that there were no meaningful
proactive interference effects in these data (despite a relatively large
sample size). First, we used the Bayes Factor approach, which can
convert a t value into the relative likelihood of the null and alter-
native hypotheses (Rouder et al., 2009 – online calculator available
at http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor). When applied to the dif-
ference in accuracy between the ﬁrst sequential position and the
average of the last three sequential positions, this analysis indi-
cated that the null hypothesis was 6.34 times more likely to be
true than the alternative hypothesis. Second, we computed the
difference in accuracy between the ﬁrst sequential position and
the average of the last three sequential positions for each partic-
ipant and conducted a conﬁdence interval analysis. This analysis
indicated that the mean difference was 1.1%, with a 95% con-
ﬁdence interval of ±3.1%. Thus, we can be 95% conﬁdent that
accuracy for the ﬁrst sequential position was no more than 4.2%
greater than the average accuracy across the last three sequential
positions. Together, these analyses indicate that the null hypothesis
was muchmore likely to be true than the hypothesis of a proactive
interference effect, and even if there was a proactive interference
effect, it was very small (much smaller than the effect observed by
Hartshorne, 2008).
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to generalize the results of Exper-
iment 1 and rule out a potential explanation for the lack of any
evidence of proactive interference. Speciﬁcally, a task switching
cost in Experiment 1 may have impaired performance for the ﬁrst
few trials of each block, offsetting a release from proactive interfer-
ence thatwouldotherwise havebeenvisible.Manyprevious studies
of proactive interference using this approach have observed release
from proactive interference (greater accuracy on the ﬁrst few trials
of each block) despite having this same type of task switching (e.g.,
Wickens et al., 1963; Hartshorne, 2008). However, it is nonetheless
important to rule out the possibility that a small proactive inter-
ference effect was present in Experiment 1 but was masked by a
small task switching cost.
To assess this possibility, we conducted a session entirely using
color change detection, but we made one set of colors very com-
mon and another set very rare (see Figure 3). Trials with the rare
color setwere separatedby an average of 19 trials using the frequent
color set, which should have virtually eliminated any proactive
interference for the rare color set. Conversely, the vast majority
of trials with the frequent color set were preceded by several tri-
als with the same set of colors, which should have maximized
proactive interference. If proactive interference contributes signif-
icantly to performance in this paradigm, then participants should
be much less accurate for the frequently occurring color set than
for the infrequently occurring color set.
METHOD
Participants
Anewgroupof 20undergraduate students from the samepool par-
ticipated for course credit. These participants reported no history
of neurological problems and reported having normal color vision
and normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
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FIGURE 3 | Stimuli and design used in Experiment 2. (A) Cool and warm color sets. (B) Sequence of events on a typical single trial with each color set. (C)
Method for ensuring that each trial using the rare color set was separated by 10–28 trials using the frequent color set.
Stimuli
The stimuli were the same as those in the color condition of
Experiment 1, except that different colors were used. Colors
were separated into two sets, each with four values. The warm
color set consisted of red (u′ = 0.467, v ′ = 0.520; 21.85 cd/m2),
pink (u′ = 0.301, v ′ = 0.421; 36.09 cd/m2), orange (u′ = 0.356,
v ′ = 0.533; 32.88 cd/m2), and yellow (u′ = 0.230, v ′ = 0.546;
74.62 cd/m2). The cool color set consisted of blue (u′ = 0.176,
v ′ = 0.167; 11.32 cd/m2), green (u′ = 0.128, v ′ = 0.556;
69.19 cd/m2), violet (u′ = 0.233, v ′ = 0.235; 18.74 cd/m2), and
cyan (u′ = 0.173, v ′ = 0.444; 50.28 cd/m2). As illustrated in
Figure 3A, the two color sets were very distinct from each other,
and yet the colors within each set could easily be discriminated.
On any given trial, the colors of the ﬁve items were selected at
random from either the cool set or the warm set, but with the con-
straint that no color could appear more than two times in a single
array. This constraint was necessary to maintain a set size of ﬁve
items (thereby avoiding ceiling and ﬂoor effects) without having
so many different colors within a set that they would be difﬁcult
to discriminate from each other. The small number of colors in
each set also increased the likelihood that the colors used on one
trial of the frequent set had been repeated multiple times over the
past few trials. When a change occurred, the change was always to
a different member of the same set.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3B),
except as follows. For each subject, one of the two color sets was
frequent and the other was rare (this assignment was counter-
balanced across subjects). The frequent set occurred on 95% of
trials and the rare set occurred on 5% of trials. Between 10 and
28 trials with the frequent color set were interposed between
each trial with the rare color set. This was achieved by dividing
the sequence of trials into alternating groups of 10 trials: one
group in which all 10 trials used the frequent color set followed
by one group in which 9 of the 10 trials used the frequent set
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and 1 randomly selected trial used the rare set (see Figure 3C).
Each participant was tested in a single session of 32 blocks of
20 trials, with a break between each block. This yielded a total
of 32 trials of the rare color set and 608 trials of the frequent
color set.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Accuracy was computed separately for trials using the rare and
frequent color sets, disregarding which colors were rare or fre-
quent for a given participant. As shown in Figure 4,mean accuracy
was very similar for trials using the rare and frequent color sets.
A paired t -test indicated that there was no signiﬁcant difference
between these trial types, t (18)= 1.70, p = 0.1063, and the small
and non-signiﬁcant difference was actually in the direction of
greater accuracy for the frequent color set. The Bayes factor analy-
sis indicated that the null hypothesis was 1.60 times more likely
to be true than the alternative hypothesis. This value was not as
high as in Experiment 1, but this may simply reﬂect the small and
non-signiﬁcant difference in the direction opposite to the effect
predicted by proactive interference.
We also performed a conﬁdence interval analysis on the differ-
ence in accuracy between the two trial types (rareminus frequent).
The mean difference score was −3.5% with a 95% conﬁdence
interval of ±3.8%. In other words, we have 95% conﬁdence that
the effect of trial type was between −7.3 and +0.3%. Thus, we
can be 95% certain that any impairment in performance due to
repetition of a color set was less than 0.3%.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that memory
performance in the canonical version of the change detection task
depends virtually exclusively onmemory for the current trial, with
little or no impact of memory frompreceding trials. Evenwhen the
same four colors were repeated trial after trial, these data indicate
that memory was no more than 0.3% worse than memory for col-
ors that appeared only infrequently. Thus,we can be conﬁdent that
proactive interference does not meaningfully distort estimates of
working memory capacity in this variant of the change detection
paradigm.
FIGURE 4 | Mean change detection accuracy for trials with the
frequent and rare color sets in Experiment 2 (error bars show 95%
within-subjects confidence intervals, as described by Loftus and
Loftus, 1988).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous research clearly indicates that long-term memory
processes, including proactive interference, can sometimes lead
to the appearance of capacity limitations (Crowder, 1982; Bad-
deley, 1986; Suprenant and Neath, 2009). Research by Makovski
and Jiang (2008) and by Hartshorne (2008) has further shown
that proactive interference can inﬂuence estimates of visual work-
ing memory capacity in the change detection paradigm. However,
as noted by Hartshorne (2008), the effects of proactive interfer-
ence on change detection in these studies were modest and cannot
explain the very strict limits on visual working memory capac-
ity observed in change detection experiments. The present study
goes one step further, showing that proactive interference can be
virtually eliminated when the stimuli are simple, the sample array
is brief, and the retention interval is short. Although the present
results do not indicate which of these factors are essential, they do
indicate that it is possible to use these parameters to isolate work-
ing memory capacity, independent of proactive interference from
long-termmemory. Similar parameters were used in a study show-
ing a very strong correlation (r2 = 0.79) between visual working
memory capacity and performance on a broad battery of higher
cognitive function (Gold et al., 2010), so it seems likely that this
correlation was not driven by individual differences in proactive
interference. Future studies linking visual workingmemory capac-
ity with other cognitive processes would be well advised to use
similar parameters as well.
More broadly, these results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that a short-term visual storage system exists that can be
distinguished from long-term memory. The idea of separate
short-term and long-term memory stores has been widely crit-
icized in the context of verbal memory (Crowder, 1982; Ran-
ganath and Blumenfeld, 2005; Suprenant and Neath, 2009).
However, there is excellent evidence of active maintenance of
visual information during the delay interval in change detec-
tion tasks (Vogel and Machizawa, 2004; Todd and Marois, 2005;
Xu and Chun, 2006). A recent study also provided signiﬁ-
cant evidence of active maintenance of semantic information
in working memory (Shivde and Anderson, 2011). The present
results, together with those of Hartshorne (2008), indicate that
the severe limits on visual working memory capacity cannot
be explained by proactive interference. Similarly, Lin and Luck
(2008) showed that similarity-based interference – which plays
a major role in failures of long-term memory retrieval – has no
signiﬁcant effect on visual working memory performance in the
canonical version of the change detection task. Together, these
results provide converging evidence against a monolithic view of
memory.
It is important to consider whether the lack of an effect of
sequential position in Experiment 1 and the lack of a differ-
ence between the rare and frequent stimulus sets in Experiment
2 might reﬂect the presence of equivalent amounts of proactive
interference across conditions rather than an absence of proactive
interference. Although it is impossible to rule out this possibility,
it seems very unlikely. First, the manipulation used in Experiment
1 has been found to produce substantial proactive interference
effects inmanyprevious studies (e.g.,Wickens et al., 1963;Bunting,
2006; Hartshorne, 2008). There is no obvious reason why there
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would be no evidence of release from proactive interference in
the present experiment when the same manipulation produced
reliable effects in prior studies (except that the present version
of the task is not inﬂuenced by proactive interference). Second,
Experiment 2 used an extrememanipulation, in which trials using
the frequent stimulus set were preceded by an average of 18 suc-
cessive trials that used exactly the same set of four colors, which
should have produced massive proactive interference (if proactive
interference could inﬂuence performance in this task). In contrast,
trials using the rare stimulus set were preceded by an average of 18
successive trials using a different stimulus set, which should have
producedminimal proactive interference. If proactive interference
could inﬂuence performance in the present task, it would be very
surprising not to observe a difference in performance between
these two extreme conditions. Thus, although it is never possi-
ble to prove the null hypothesis, the present experiments provide
strong support for the proposal that proactive interference has very
little effect on performance of the canonical version of the change
detection task.
An important caveat is that long-term memory can cer-
tainly inﬂuence change detection performance under some con-
ditions. With longer stimulus durations, Makovski and Jiang
(2008) andHartshorne (2008) found evidence of modest proactive
interference, suggesting that long-term memory can play a role
when sufﬁcient time is provided for long-term memory encod-
ing. Similarly, patients with medial temporal lobe amnesia exhibit
deﬁcits on change detection with long retention intervals (8 s) but
not short retention intervals (1 s; Olson et al., 2006), suggesting
that long-termmemorymechanisms begin to play a role when the
retention interval increases. In addition, in studies using relatively
long encoding periods and retention intervals, Gazzaley and his
colleagues have shown that information may initially be stored in
an active form in working memory, then temporarily displaced
while another task is being performed, and then be restored from
long-term memory (Clapp et al., 2010). Thus, although change
detection paradigms can isolate an active short-term storage sys-
tem under some conditions, these paradigms can also be strongly
inﬂuenced by long-termmemory systems under other conditions.
Considerable caution is therefore necessary when using change
detection paradigms to isolate active, short-term memory storage
mechanisms.
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